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The purpose of this thesis is to research a housing program for internally displaced per-
sons (IDPs) in Ukraine and identify factors hindering its successful implementation (suc-
cess in this thesis is defined as high rates of participation). Housing policy is important 
to be researched because it has a crucial influence on the ability of IDPs to adapt to a 
new community. Access to adequate and affordable housing is the first step in their pro-
cess of resettlement and integration. 
The Affordable Housing Program (AHP) of Ukraine was designed according to the pref-
erences of IDPs and provided them with funding for housing purchase since 2017, but 
the program lacked participants. To find out why, there was, firstly, a detailed analysis 
of program design and its’ requirements conducted. After that, 24 Ukrainian IDPs were 
interviewed including AHP participants and the control group of other IDPs. The re-
search supported the hypotheses of the thesis and concluded that the main factors con-
tributing to hindering the program are (hypothesis 1) administrative issues with the pro-
cedure (the most important of them being the long waiting queue for the assistance) and 
(hypothesis 2) the high financial requirements of the program, which were difficult to be 
met by participants. 
Two other hypotheses of the research were not supported. The first one stated that the 
IDPs do not participate in AHP because of the lack of knowledge about the program, 
when in actuality they were well-informed about assistance programs. The other stated 
that IDPs have no need of private ownership of housing, but the interviewees expressed 
an aspiration to purchase housing.  
Despite those aspirations, IDPs were rather limited in their financial abilities to purchase 
housing, even with AHP assistance. Thus, it was concluded that the state should provide 
displaced people with different kinds of programs helping not only with purchase, but 
also giving options of affordable temporary accommodation. Otherwise, the general in-
tegration of IDPs into a new community (as well as their employment, political partici-
pation, getting healthcare, education and other services) will be hindered by the absence 
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According to the High Commissioner for Refugees, there were around 79.5 million 
people around the world in the beginning of 2020 who have been forced to flee their 
homes (UNHCR, 2020). Only 26 million among them were refugees, while most of them 
were internally displaced people (IDPs). IDP is a person who has been forced to leave his 
or her home because of a dangerous situation there (natural or armed conflict one). IDPs 
are in crucial need of integration in the new place of residence. Thus, it is important to 
execute proper policies and address the difficulties of the displaced people. 
Among the most common problems IDPs face are sheltering, loss of income, poverty and 
marginalization, access to basic necessities and services such as education and health 
care, family and community-structures collapse, discrimination, risk of exploitation, 
abuse, and mental health issues. Among these challenges, one of the most crucial 
problems is finding permanent housing. There is ample evidence suggesting that poor 
housing inhibits IDPs’ integration and leads to poor health, educational and employment 
opportunities and even attempts to rebuild family life. In fact, housing is the main issue 
for displaced people in Ukraine - 20% of IDPs in Ukraine consider living conditions to 
be the biggest problem (IOM, 2019). 
While there is plenty of research on housing policies addressing IDPs in other regions 
(the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and other), the scholarly community lacks studies 
on IDPs issues in post-soviet regions, partly because previous conflicts in this region 
(Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan) have not caused so many people to become displaced as 
conflicts in, for example, the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, etc). 
However, after the start of Russian aggression in 2014, Ukraine ranks among the top ten 
countries in the world by the number of IDPs. Its experience and solutions of dealing with 
this internal migration crisis may be applicable for other post-soviet countries with 
conflict. Thus, the case of Ukraine is important for further research. 
In Ukraine, there are several programs providing housing for IDPs. The Affordable 
Housing Program (AHP) was one of the most well-funded and best suited to the needs of 
IDPs. Despite this, only 16,000 IDPs are currently participating in this program (State 
Fund, 2020) - even though there are almost 1.5 million IDPs in the country (Ministry of 




the initial research question for this thesis, i.e. to find out if there any clearly identifiable 
factors that hinder the availability, access, or participation of IDPs in this program. 
The first hypothesis of this thesis is that the program criteria (in particular, criteria related 
to financial factors) are the reason why Affordable Housing is not available for the 
majority of IDPs. The second hypothesis is that the administrative procedure of AHP 
enrolment may be too difficult, hence making the program unavailable. The third 
hypothesis is that IDPs do not apply for the program because they do not know about it. 
Thus, there is a lack of knowledge. The final hypothesis was that IDPs do not participate 
because they have no need to purchase housing. 
To check these hypotheses, qualitative research (document analysis of the program 
design) and 24 interviews were conducted. The interviews were conducted with two 
groups of people: 13 interviews with IDPs who have participated in Affordable housing 
(received assistance or refusal or are currently in a waiting queue for the decision) and 11 
interviews with IDPs from the control group who have not participated in AHP. The first 
group was asked questions about their experience of enrolment to AHP. The second group 
was familiarized with the terms of the program and asked if those terms were convenient 
and they would be able participate in Affordable Housing. 
All in all, the document analysis and interviews supported the first two hypotheses. 
Interviewees were limited in their ability to pay for the new housing due to many factors: 
lack of savings, high lending rates in Ukrainian banks, high housing prices on a first-hand 
market, etc. Furthermore, the price limit for the new housing required by the program was 
assessed by many IDPs as insufficient and below the real market price. Thus, the financial 
program criteria were too high for common IDPs to meet. 
Secondly, the research discovered administrative issues hinder the availability of the 
program - almost as much as financial criteria. Among these were issues with document 
collection, their submission, and most importantly – long waiting queues. 
Finally, the third and fourth hypotheses were not confirmed. IDPs had plenty of 
knowledge about AHP and other assistance programs. They also aspired to buy housing. 
Thus, these hypotheses were not able to explain the lack of AHP participants. 
Despite all these drawbacks, participants of the AHP estimate it quite highly and the AHP 




mostly reasonable (having logic behind them). Thus, it can be concluded from this 
research that the Ukrainian program (aiming for IDPs to choose their housing themselves 
but giving them financial assistance) is a good long-term solution for IDPs and its 
experience could be also applied to other countries with similar context. 
However, it needs further development and, most importantly, more financing from the 
state budget. On the other hand, the general housing policy (including not only AHP but 
other programs as well) needs to offer diverse solutions – not only purchasing housing 
but granting temporary housing as well. This would allow different types of IDPs with 
different financial situation to receive assistance. 
The structure of the thesis proceeds as follows. There are four main parts: firstly, the 
chapter on theoretical background compares the experience of other post-Soviet countries 
dealing with the IDP issue. It explains different options of IDP housing policies and the 
need for solutions allowing private long-term accommodation. The Ukrainian solution 
(AHP) is described starting with the general history of displacement and ending with the 
details of the program and possible issues resulting in a lack of participation in AHP. The 
theoretical chapter not only formulates hypotheses but also helps draw a policy 
recommendation on better housing programs for IDPs in the end of thesis. 
Secondly, the chapter on methodology explains research design. After that, the third 
chapter discusses the main findings supporting and refuting hypotheses. It is separated 
into three parts: one for the description of administrative issues associated with the 
program, one for problems related with program requirements and one for formulating a 
policy recommendation and advice on possible solutions for the program related issues 
(based on the needs of IDPs as well as the international experience described in the 





2. Theoretical background 
2.1 Terminology 
This subchapter is setting the definitions of the main terms used in this thesis. The term 
“internally displaced person” follows the definition stated in the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement approved by the United Nations (UN) in 1998 and widely used by 
governments, regional bodies and NGOs all over the world, i.e. is internationally 
recognised (Mooney, 2005). It defines internally displaced persons as: 
“Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their 
homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the 
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or 
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally 
recognized state border”. 
The term “migrants” is used in the text since theoretical literature on them was also used 
in the research (since they have a similar experience of changing location and 
community). Migrants usually differ from IDPs because they have crossed state borders. 
The term “displaced people” is also used in the text and it means migrants who have not 
only crossed state borders but did it because of natural, technological or deliberate event 
at their home country. The principal difference is that migrants may choose to move 
voluntarily, whereas displaced people move to avoid consequences of conflicts or 
disasters. The literature on displaced people was also used in this research because they 
have a similar experience of unvoluntary dislocation as IDPs. 
2.2 Comparison of post-soviet countries on IDP housing policies 
This subchapter gives an overview of successful and less successful housing programs 
for IDPs across the post-Soviet region in countries with a history of conflict (Georgia, 
Moldova and Azerbaijan). This comparison is done to identify policy elements and 
features that are important for the success of housing programs and further integration of 
displaced people into a host community. This allows examination of whether those factors 
are also present in the Ukrainian case – in the AHP. This will also help to answer the 




yes, the reason for program lacking participants should lie in its implementation. Thus, 
this analysis will help to either prove or refute the idea that the AHP’s design is the reason 
for a lack of participation. 
Housing has a crucial influence on the ability of displaced people to adapt to a new 
regional community. Access to adequate and affordable housing is a first step in their 
process of resettlement and integration. There is ample evidence suggesting that poor 
housing inhibits IDPs’ integration and leads to poor health, educational and employment 
opportunities and even attempts to rebuild family life (Carter & Polevychok, 2004; 
Wilkinson, 2008). 
For example, dealing with housing issues is crucial for employment. Since in case it is in 
the region of low economic activity possibilities for the job search will be rather limited. 
Furthermore, this affects the economic conditions of displaced households (i.e a group of 
people living as a family) and poverty among them (Wilkinson, 2008). The example of 
Georgia after the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 in the regions of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia shows that resettlement of IDPs in rural areas with limited employment 
opportunities was among the main reason for them to return home, i.e. back to conflict 
areas (Kurshitashvili, 2012). At the same time, DeVoretz, Pivenko, & Beiser (2004) when 
discussing the resettlement experience of displaced people in Canada refer to the high 
dependence on social assistance. IDPs are often not able to solve their housing issues 
without the help of the state and are in crucial need of housing policies. 
Below is an analytical comparison of how these policies were implemented in 4 post-
Soviet countries (table 1). The general conclusion based on the analysis in this chapter is 
that Georgian, Azerbaijanian and Moldovian housing programs were not successful 
because they did not offer viable long-term housing solutions. Temporary 
accommodation for IDPs was renovated and privatized with time, but its infrastructure 
and location could not be changed. Thus, it was not appropriate for full scale integration 
of displaced into the new communities. 
The comparative analysis of these countries shows not only how housing issues were 
dealt with across the region and what may be the results of different housing programs, it 
also allows to form comprehensive policy solutions, as suggested in in the fourth chapter 




Table 1. Comparison of four post-soviet countries with the experience of mass internal 
displacement and housing policies 
 Georgia Azerbaijan Moldova Ukraine 
Period of 
conflict 
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Source: author’s compilation, based on chapters 2.2.1.-2.3. 
2.2.1 Georgia 
In August 2008, armed conflict broke out between Georgia on the one side and Russia 
and separatist groups in South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other. From the beginning the 
Georgian government had plans for returning Abkhazia and repatriating IDPs. Prior to 
the enactment of the State Strategy in 2009, the government’s political interest has been 
limited to the belief that if IDPs remain in local populations for too long, they may lose 
their ability to return to their places of origin, which could endanger Georgia's territorial 
claims. The National Strategy and Action Plan, which addressed the problems of housing 
and socio-economic integration, was adopted in 2009. It was, however, still concerned 
with a peaceful return of IDPs to their original home. (Gogisvili, 2015). 
A good illustration of this policy goal was the governmental program “My Home”. It was 
intended to record property and create a real estate database of belongings of the victims 
in Abkhazia. This archive contains satellite images and other documents on the property 
left behind by IDPs as they escaped the abuses in the early 1990s. (OSCE, 2015). 
Thus, IDPs were provided not with permanent but with temporary housing in Collective 
Centers. 55% chose to live in private accommodation (mostly rented or provided by 
relatives). As of 2013, 45% of IDPs (more than 113,000 persons) lived densely in several 
‘Collective Centers’ (CCs) that were created on the basis of former public non-residential 
buildings (Gogisvili, 2015). These centers were often renovated from industrial or 
commercial buildings (schools, kindergartens, hospitals, government buildings) that were 
never designed for permanent housing in the first place. 
IDPs had to use ‘Do-It-Yourself' methods to rebuild homes, mostly interiors, to make 
spaces and rooms “liveable” since almost none of the Collective Centers were designed 
for residential purposes. Such practices often meant extending living space by 




entrances converted to living quarters, windows converted to partitions, spaces under 
stairs converted to utility or storage rooms, and so on. 
Since most Collective Centres lacked living areas, some residents began appropriating 
public property, or so-called "No Man's Land," around their living area or within the 
houses. IDPs often used land areas around CCs for agricultural activities – approximately 
20% of IDPs reported that they initiated different kinds of agricultural activities around 
their buildings. Locals were often displeased with the use of public property when they 
wanted to use the same land or were dissatisfied with the new constructions that had been 
erected. 
Another downside to CCs was that they were often found on the edges of towns, mostly 
separated from the surrounding areas and often clustered together, creating small 
communities (Kabachnik et al., 2014). Moreover, IDPs were often settled among other 
vulnerable and marginalized populations (Mitchneck et al., 2009) and even clustered in 
areas close to the conflict zone (Holtzman and Nezam, 2004). One possible explanation 
for this spatial trend may be that few empty buildings could be found in the centers of 
cities. Also, the government aspired to exclude ‘problematic groups’ as they were 
‘eyesores’ for the central areas with the majority of the financial flows directed there 
(Gogisvili, 2015). Finally, the government tried to maintain control over IDPs which is 
best exercised if they are concentrated. 
As a result, IDPs became increasingly reliant on public transportation, complicating their 
mobility and isolating them from local residents, basic infrastructure, and civic facilities, 
as almost no Georgian city provided a viable public transportation system. Government 
actions often exacerbated objective causes of isolation. Children who had been internally 
displaced were often encouraged to attend special, "IDP-only" schools (built near 
Collective centers and run by the Abkhaz government in exile) (Gogisvili, 2015). 
Secondly, due to the conditions in Collective Centres, IDPs had less job opportunities. 
They learned less about skill-enhancing and career options because of the high 
concentration of CCs – the neighborhood socialization trend led them to rely more on 
localized social networks, potentially restricting job opportunities. The only advantage of 




CCs was not possible. This law, however, was often broken in practice. (Tarkhan-
Mouravi, 2009) 
In the end, when it became clear that the return of migrants to Abkhazia would not happen 
in the nearest future, the privatization of Collective Centers began with the launch of the 
Strategy in 2009. By the end of 2013, 29,000 families had been provided with housing 
that was mostly renovated on the basis of former Collective Centres (MRA, 2013). 
Additionally, new building blocks for IDPs were built and transferred into IDP 
ownership. 
Unfortunately, the geospatial features of Collective Centers were repeated in the new IDP 
districts, which were established also in rural areas and on the outskirts of towns. The 
four districts that were established between 2010 and 2012 were located on the least 
attractive lands. Many areas in Georgia, which seemed unappealing for any other use, had 
either remained unused for decades or have been used to house IDPs. 
Most aspects of Collective Centers were often repeated in the ‘new districts.' The areas 
around the new housing districts were mostly used for non-residential (often industrial) 
purposes and were often uninhabited, serving as factories, warehouses, or simply vacant. 
They were often surrounded by abandoned brownfields and deteriorated urban landscapes 
- regions with poor market positions. (Gogisvili, 2015). 
Understanding these issues, the Georgian government decided to introduce an 
experimental program of housing vouchers in Kutaisi from 2005 to 2007 (Golda, 2009). 
175 families took part in this program, receiving a guaranteed subsidy to purchase 
housing. These vouchers were different from cash payments only in that fact they could 
only be spent on housing. The experiment was rather successful, but was not implemented 
further because of high costs for the state budget (Khomeriki, 2014). 
However, studying this experimental program, Golda concluded that the next factors are 
important for the success of a housing program (2009, 55): 
- «the political will to improve living conditions for the displaced» 
- «an available supply of housing units» 
- «private ownership of property» (i.e. privatization of those housing units allocated 




- «operating and trustworthy banking institutions» 
To conclude, mismanagement or inability of the Georgian state to address IDP needs 
have, in large part, caused the marginalization and isolation of IDPs together with the 
impact of the socially homogeneous environment created within their settlements. The 
one experimental program using housing vouchers did show significant results, but it was 
not prolonged by the government. 
2.2.2 Azerbaijan 
The First Karabakh War - an armed conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over 
control of Nagorno-Karabakh lasted from September 1987 to May 1994. IDPs in 
Azerbaijan were also provided only with temporary and not permanent housing and 
privileges with regard to payment of utilities. Residential, administrative and subsidiary 
buildings which were suitable for living or could be made such were used for settlement 
purposes (UNHCR, 2009). 
Many IDPs initially stayed in deplorable circumstances in communal public buildings in 
urban areas or rural villages in desperate need of repair. Tent camps were the most 
extreme instances of insufficient accommodation, as well as train wagons. Fortunately, 
these cases have been diminished with the State Program since 2009. IDPs in these 
settlements have been resettled in newly constructed homes and have demonstrated 
general satisfaction with the program's implementation. 
However, several new settlements have been built only a few kilometers from the military 
conflict line, posing serious security concerns. Furthermore, the remoteness of some 
settlements makes it difficult for some IDPs to find work and access basic services like 
education and healthcare (UNHCR, 2009). 
The problem is that the government of Azerbaijan is not aiming for integration of IDPs. 
The nation has passed applicable legislation governing IDPs' status and allowing for their 
return to their homes after the dispute is resolved (Yunusov, 2013). The Azerbaijani 
government adopted principles in 2005 that stipulate the voluntary principle of return, as 
well as the division of responsibilities among different government departments to assist 




To conclude, IDPs were unable to obtain private housing in government-sponsored CCs 
that had been organised only for their temporary use. Privatization did not take place the 
same way it did in Georgia. Return, in the Government's opinion, is evidently preferable. 
In fact, it is thought to be the only long-term solution. Azerbaijan, like Georgia, struggled 
to provide accommodation for IDPs that would facilitate their incorporation and 
economic activity. IDPs became isolated and even marginalized as a result of this. 
2.2.3 Moldova 
The conflict in Trans-Dniester in 1992 between the Moldovan authorities and the self-
proclaimed Transnistrian Moldavian Republic, supported by Russia, resulted in 51,000 
IDPs. However, a ceasefire signed in July 1992 caused a large number of the IDPs to 
return home. According to governmental sources, up to 25,000 IDPs were still displaced 
from the Transdniestrian region in 2003, but the central authorities have been not able to 
document this figure (UNHCR, 2004). The state committee introduced in 1992 to deal 
with the IDP crisis (The “Commission for the Liquidation of the Consequences of the 
Armed Conflict in Transdniestria”) was dissolved in 1995. 
There were only 1,000 IDPs of concern to UNHCR at the end of 2002, implying that the 
vast majority of IDPs were able to successfully incorporate into Moldova community 
(UNHCR, 2004). Housing was given to displaced families, with combatants and political 
activists receiving priority. In addition, IDPs had their residency status legalized and got 
some financial assistance (Ciumas, 2013). The State's restricted financial resources and 
institutional obstacles, however, severely limited this assistance (UNHCR, 2004). 
To summarize, after a truce in July 1992, IDPs began to return home in large numbers, 
and Moldova had no need for their absorption. If they aspired to migrate, the majority of 
the displaced people did so, mainly to Ukraine (UNHCR, 2004). As a result, temporary 
rental assistance was provided, but no permanent housing services were introduced by 
the Government of Moldova. 
Thus, looking back on the experience across the region, the following factors can be 
considered as important for the success of housing policy: 
- availability for IDPs of not only temporary housing units but long-term options 




- location of this housing in the areas of economic activity 
- presence of transport, education and other kinds of infrastructure around that 
housing 
- neighbourhood consisting of locals to enable socialization and integration in the 
local community. 
2.3 Housing policy in Ukraine 
2.3.1 General principles of housing policy for IDPs 
This section analyses the Ukrainian IDP housing policy. The results of the analysis show 
that the five aforementioned factors of success (availability of long-term housing, private 
ownership of it, appropriate location, developed infrastructure and community 
integration) are present in the Affordable Housing Program. However, the question is 
what are the other aspects that can hinder the program success (high rates of AHP 
participation)? 
To begin with, according to the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, as of November 
2020, there are 1.5 million internally displaced citizens (IDPs) as the result of the conflict 
in the Eastern part of the country and annexation of the Crimea Peninsula in February-
March 2014. Mass internal migration of these citizens started in March 2014 immediately 
after the Crimea occupation and drastically increased at the end of the spring when the 
armed conflict in the Eastern part of Ukraine started. Most IDPs migrated with their 
families and left the conflict territories before the autumn of 2014. As of November 2014, 
the total number of displaced persons has already exceeded 1 million (Ministry of social 
policy, 2021). After that the migration wave started to decrease because the most 
economically viable categories of the population have already left regions of conflict. 
However, gradual migration is observed even today. 
From the beginning, there was an understanding among the Ukrainian policy-makers that 
the occupation of Crimea as well the conflict in the Donbass region are long-standing 
problems for Ukraine. Right from the start, this war was expected “to become one of the 
long-term “frozen zones” (Altshuller, 2017:7). Thus, most IDPs will not be able to return 
to their homes in the nearest future, which is why the programs were designed allowing 




A comprehensive state program on support, social adaptation and reintegration of IDPs 
was adopted at the end of 2015. According to this initiative, four programs were aimed to 
deal with the IDP housing issues (Сabinet of Ministers, 2015): 
1. Affordable Housing (Доступне житло in Ukrainian). This program was 
designed by the State Fund for Youth Housing Assistance and is financed directly 
from the state budget. Applications are received and decided by the State Fund. 
2. The program of soft loans for the purchase of housing at 3% (Програма 
пільгових кредитів під 3%). It was also designed by the State Fund for Youth 
Housing Assistance and is also funded by the state budget. Applications are 
received and decided by the State Fund. 
3. The program Own a House (Власний Дім). It provides soft loans at 3% for the 
construction of IDPs own housing in rural areas. The program is funded from 
regional budgets (subventions from the central budget go to local budgets) and 
operates not in all regions of Ukraine. 
4. Temporary housing program (Тимчасове житло). It provides free temporary 
housing for IDPs (they should only pay for utilities and other housing services). 
The program is 70% financed from the state budget and 30% from the local 
budgets. Applications are received and decided by the local governments. 
Ukrainian policy was designed completely differently from the cases of previously 
described countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova). Most Ukrainian programs (with the 
exception of temporary housing) allow IDPs to choose the location and living conditions 
themselves, which is supposed to make integration in new communities easier. Thus, 
IDPs are able to choose housing near their job place and with all the necessary 
infrastructure. The choice is limited only in the case of the fourth program where IDPs 
are provided with free temporary accommodation depending on free housing units 
available, similar to the Collective Centers (CCs) for IDPs in Georgia and Azerbaijan. 
However, in Ukraine, there is only a limited number of these Collective Centers and they 
exist as a solution for extreme situations. Only 2% of IDPs are living in CCs and this 
number is stable throughout the years (IOM, 2019). Instead, there is financial help 




help them buy or build new property. The most important one - Affordable Housing - is 
the object of this research. 
To conclude, the overall design of the program is well-suited for the needs of IDPs and it 
has the main factors needed for the success, as defined in the previous subchapter. The 
question still remains - what factors may hinder its success (defined as rates of 
participation)? 
2.3.2 Ukrainian Affordable Housing Program (AHP) 
This subchapter is describing the program in more detail and indicates that the program 
has not been successful. 
The AHP is prominent due to several reasons. First of all, it received the most finances. 
Only in one year of 2019, 300 million UAH (almost 10 million EUR) from the general 
state budget were spent on the AHP (State Fund, 2019). Soft loans received only 200 
million. The third program, Own a House, does not even function in all of the regions. 
The budget for the fourth program (temporary housing) was also quite limited, since old 
premises in state or local community ownership were used for IDPs sheltering and they 
were almost not renovated. 
Secondly, the Affordable Housing Program was better tailored according to IDPs 
expectations. According to the survey by the International Organization for Migration in 
September 2019, 44% of IDPs were interested in participating in state programs. 79% of 
them answered they would be interested in programs with partial compensation of the 
housing cost while only 36% would be interested in long-term soft loans (IOM, 2019). 
The program was started in 2009. From the beginning, it provided 30% compensation for 
the cost of new housing for families in need of better housing conditions (Ukraine has a 
single state register of such citizens). In 2017, the program was expanded to include two 
new target groups: internally displaced citizens and war veterans (Сabinet of Ministers, 
2015). For them, the program provided better financial support - compensation in the 
amount of 50% of the cost of new housing. In other words, half of the price should be 
paid by the applicant, and another half - from the state budget (Sate Fund, 2021). 
Therefore, the program is financially limited by the state annual budget. Unfortunately, 




at all because of COVID-19 pandemic and the need to create a fund for disease control 
(Fedoriv, 2020). 
However, assessing the success of the first experience with IDPs, in 2018, some 
Ukrainian regions decided to introduce their own local budgets for the Affordable housing 
program. Thus, it is limitedly implemented for the funding of local budgets at the moment. 
There are currently approximately 16,000 Ukrainians in queue to participate and get 
financial aid (State Fund, n.d.). 
The program works on the principle of "first submitted - first received". The public body 
that receives applications and monitors the queue is the State Agency for Youth Housing 
Assistance (further mentioned as State Fund). It has offices in all regions of Ukraine. 
Not every IDP family or any choice of apartment is possible according to the requirements 
of the program. The criteria for participating are the following (State Fund, 2021): 
1. Applicants should be registered as citizens in need of better living conditions 
(Ukraine has a single state register of such citizens) and submit a document 
proving it. 
2. During the last 3 years they have not been owning a living space (excluding 
housing located in the temporarily occupied territory). OR 
3. Their ownership of living space should not exceed 13.65 m2 (excluding housing 
located in the temporarily occupied territory). 
4. Their average monthly income per family member does not exceed three times 
the average monthly salary in their region. 
5. The price of new housing of their choice does not exceed a set marginal cost, 
which is defined by the program and depends on the region. 
6. The area of a new accommodation does not exceed 21 m2 per family member 
combined with additional 10.5 m2 per the whole family. 
7. The new housing should be newly built so that participants get first-hand property 
when they buy the accommodation from a building company. 
8. The applicants should be able to pay 50% of the cost themselves.   
9. In case the applicant wants to build a house and not purchase the apartment, the 
construction period should not exceed 12 months from the date of the contract 




Despite the existence of this as well as other programs, only 12% of IDPs were able to 
purchase their own housing, although 87% of people had it before resettlement (IOM, 
2019). There are several possible reasons for this. 
Firstly, the current situation with Affordable housing is difficult. In 2020 and 2021, there 
was no funding allocated for the program from the central budget at all (because of 
COVID-19 pandemic and the need to create a fund for disease control). However, it 
continues to operate in a limited fashion using funds from local budgets (State Fund, 
2020). 
Apart from objective reasons hindering the implementation of the program, there may be 
some reasons regarding the details of the program itself. There are currently only 16,000 
Ukrainians in queue to participate and get financial aid from Affordable housing (State 
Fund, 2020). If the program was designed and implemented according to all IDPs' needs, 
there would be a far greater number of people wanting to join because there are 1.5 million 
IDPs and 44% of them are interested in joining a housing assistance program (IOM, 
2019). 
Moreover, a survey conducted among the participants of the program in 2019 shows that 
42% of them indicated earning more than UAH 11,000 per month or 330 EUR (UNHCR, 
2019), which is significantly more than the average monthly income of a Ukrainian IDP 
(UAH 3,631 or 100 EUR) and the overall national average (UAH 5,398 per family 
member or 160 EUR). Furthermore, the average age of participants leans towards the 
older age group as only 26% of households included a young mother and 16% a young 
father under the age of 36 UNHCR, 2019). Thus, the state housing program is overlooking 
its target group of the majority of IDPs with limited financial resources and not belonging 
to the middle class. 
2.4. Hypothesis formulation 
From the previous analysis on the comparison of three other post-Soviet countries 
(Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova), it was concluded that Ukrainian AHP has all five 
elements of design that should at least in principle ensure its success: it provides IDPs 
with a durable housing solution, private ownership, location and infrastructure on their 
choice, which is one of the preconditions for further integration into the local community. 




own choice) is mostly appropriate and suitable. Despite this fact, the AHP lacks 
participants. Therefore, I argue that the reasons for its setback should lie in the details of 
program implementation or design details.  
Therefore, the question is which details of the program’s design and implementation are 
hindering the success of the program (which would manifest itself in more participants)? 
This subchapter analyzes five possible theoretical explanations for the lack of participants 
and their applicability to the Ukrainian AHP case in order to formulate hypotheses (c.f 
Table 2). 
RQ: What specific details of program design and implementation are hindering the 
success of the program, which would manifest itself in more participants? 
There are a lot of studies examining the question why citizens belonging to vulnerable 
groups do not participate in assistance programs (Currie, 2004; Remler & Glied, 2003). 
The first possible explanation is so-called “measurement error” by the designer of the 
program (in this case, Ministry of Social policy) (Hanratty, 2006): this happens when 
families that at first sight appear eligible for participation really are not (Daponte, 
Sanders, & Taylor, 1999). As a result, the program mistakenly expects a wider audience 
to participate. For example, state statistics can incorrectly calculate the scale of poverty 
in the country and the needs of the target group and then their food program will remain 
unclaimed. 
This would be unlikely the case for Ukraine. As it was shown in a subchapter 2.3.2 
describing AHP, according to surveys 44% of IDPs were interested in participating in 
state housing programs in Ukraine. 79% of them answered that they would be interested 
in programs with partial compensation of the housing cost (IOM, 2019). Thus, the 
Affordable housing program should be more than interesting for its target group. 
The second possible explanation, according to the literature, is that families refuse to 
participate because of the stigma attached to any kind of assistance program (Moffit, 




for a free meal in school because they are afraid of being seen by peers as poor or coming 
from a dysfunctional family. 
Again, this would unlikely be the case for Ukraine because there is no stigma attached to 
the program Affordable housing. This program is also available for veterans of the War 
in Donbas, a highly respected social group in Ukraine, as well as for common families in 
need of better housing conditions. Moreover, the State agency in charge of the application 
process does not disclose the names of applicants so that they can remain anonymous for 
the publicity. Thirdly, there is an understanding in society that IDPs are a vulnerable 
group not because of their lack of virtues but because of objective reasons for their 
displacement. 
The third possible explanation for the lack of participation is the presence of information 
barriers (Daponte, 1999). People cannot apply for the program if they do not know about 
its existance. This could definitely be an issue for Ukraine. According to the IOM survey 
in September 2019, only one third of IDPs have heard about the state housing programs 
(IOM, 2019). Moreover, the fact that they have heard about the programs does not 
necessarily mean they know enough about it. 
The fourth possible explanation lies in administrative issues related to participation in 
assistance programs. For example, the application process may be too difficult or long. 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) survey in 1996 concluded that "the 
average household spent five hours applying for food stamps and two to three hours 
certifying its eligibility to continue to receive assistance" and this process was viewed by 
them as substantially burdening (Hanratty, 2006: 604). 
This may be a crucial issue of the Ukrainian program because the application process 
requires submission of a many documents about income, family composition, IDP status, 
employment, housing project, etc. Additionally, there is a waiting queue to get assistance, 




The fifth possible explanation, according to the literature, may be in the requirements of 
the program. Research on the American state programs Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) and Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs have 
concluded that welfare reform introducing more requirements for enrolment reduced 
Food Stamp participation (Currie & Grogger, 2001; Kornfeld, 2002; Mills, Sundar, 
Peterson, & Alwang, 2001). The harshness of enrolment requirements could definitely be 
the issue in the Ukrainian case. 
Some program criteria could have hindered the availability of AHP, financial ones in 
particular. The financial side of the housing issue proves to be the most important for 
IDPs. For instance, according to studies of displaced persons in Canada, the cost of 
housing was of prime importance for about 40% of respondents compared to other criteria 
of “accessibility (to work, school and public transportation), social networks (proximity 
to relatives, friends and members of the same ethnic group) and a residual category 
referred to as ‘other” (Danso, 2002).  
Ukrainian IDPs are no exception to this general trend. According to an IOM survey, 40% 
of displaced citizens cannot pay rent/mortgage payments for housing on time and in full. 
Moreover, 56% cannot pay for utilities on time and in full (IOM, 2019). These numbers 
prove that this social group is extremely constrained in their financial abilities to pay for 
housing. Thus, the price of accommodation becomes the most important criteria of choice 
for them. The prime importance of the financial factor for IDPs is supported not only by 
theoretical literature, but also by Ukrainian surveys. 
Moreover, the financial side of the issue is strictly defined with the Affordable Housing 
Program criteria. The price of a new accommodation should not exceed a set marginal 
cost and, more importantly, participants should be able to pay 50% of the cost themselves. 
As a result of this requirement, middle-income Ukrainians are expected to be more able 
to apply for assistance. The data shows that the surveyed households participating in the 




households in their regions (UNHCR, 2019). This research hypothesis is that the financial 
criteria is the factor most hindering the availability of the program. However, some other 
criteria may be difficult for applicants to satisfy. 
Finally, a completely opposite hypothesis would be that the program is available for the 
IDPs, but they do not apply because they do not want to purchase housing. Previous 
research on migrants concludes that they may choose renting as the best housing decision 
until they are confident in their financial stability and choice to live in a certain location 
(Wu, 2004). IDPs may also be happy with living with relatives. Thus, the lack of 
participation is caused by the lack of need for purchasing accommodation. There is also 
a possibility that all of these hypotheses (с.f. Table 2) are partially correct depending on 
the type of IDPs and their individual circumstances. 
Table 2. Possible hypotheses explaining limited participation in the AHP 
H1 Lack of knowledge about AHP(IV) ----------> Availability of the program (DV) 
H2 Program criteria (IV) ----------> Availability of the program (DV) 
H3  Administrative procedures (IV) ----------> Availability of the program (DV) 
H4 Need to purchase housing (IV) ----------> Participation in the program (DV) 
As the hypotheses were stated based on the aforementioned theoretical postulates, the 
next chapter will explain the choice of methodology used to check them – interviews. The 
questions formulated for the questionnaire and asked in the interviews are based on the 
theoretical postulates provided in this subchapter. Every question is linked to a particular 
hypothesis and theoretical postulate. After that, the fourth chapter will look into the results 






3. Research design and methodology 
3.1 Data collection method 
This chapter explains the method of collecting data, the choice for the semi-structured 
interviews, sampling strategy and data collection principles. IDPs were asked about the 
experience of resettlement and involvement in the state program in the form of a semi-
structured interview with open-ended questions. Beth L. Leech (2014) describes this as 
the best possible choice when there is some pre-existing knowledge on the topic but not 
enough to formulate a confident hypothesis limited to strictly one independent variable. 
Semi-structured interviews allow going into depth perspective and testing several pre-
existing hypotheses at the same time. Even though there were four hypotheses in this 
research, it could be expected that during the interviews other independent variables may 
be discovered of some importance. 
Thus, additional reasons may be discovered not predicted by the theoretical literature 
because academic implications in the field of housing programs for IDPs is rather limited. 
There is a lack of studies about internal displacement in post-Soviet region, partly because 
previous conflicts in this region (Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan) have not caused so many 
people to become displaced as conflicts in, for example, the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon, Israel, etc). Moreover, the relevant literature often does not make a distinction 
between internal and international forced migration (Salukvadze, 2014), which 
significantly limits the validity of these studies. 
Thus, semi-structured interviews were the best option allowing a researcher to have 
flexibility and ask additional questions if needed. The questionnaire for those interviews 
was based on theories described in the previous, second chapter. Every question is linked 
to a particular hypothesis. See Table 3 to trace this link theory-hypothesis-question.  
The interview was divided into four parts asking about the source of knowledge about the 
program (H1) according to the first hypothesis, general program criteria and financial 
criteria in particular (H2) according to the second hypothesis, and administrative issues 
(H3) according to the third hypothesis. It is important to mention that the questionnaire 
for non-participants did not ask them about administrative issues related to the program, 




to check the fourth hypothesis (H4) about whether AHP participants are happy with their 





Table 3. The questionnaires 
Hypothesis Theory Question for participants Question for non-participants 






(Daponte, 1999). People 
cannot apply for the program 
if they do not know about its 
existence. 
1. Where and what did you hear about the 
Affordable Housing program? 
 
1. Do you have an IDP status certificate? Do you know anything about state 
housing programs for IDPs? If yes, what exactly? Have you ever heard about 












Requirements of the program. 
The more requirements for 
enrollment cause the more 
reduction participation 
(Currie & Grogger, 2001; 
Kornfeld, 2002; Mills, 
Sundar, Peterson, & Alwang, 
2001) 
2. Did you meet all the criteria when you applied 
for the program? If no, what criteria did you not 
meet? 
3. How do you estimate the criteria for applying 
for the program? Are all of them easy to meet? If 
not, what was difficult for you to fulfill? 
4. Is it difficult to find housing (or create a 
building project) both according to your needs and 
program criteria (particularly, considering price 
and area limits)? 
2.Do you want to buy a housing property? 
If yes, would you rather consider first-hand or second-hand market? Why? 
Affordable housing gives assistance for first-hand only. Do you consider this 
requirement legitimate? Why yes/no? 
 
3.Do you own a living space (excluding housing located in the temporarily 
occupied territory)? According to program requirements, an applicant cannot 
own more than 14 m2. Do you find this requirement legitimate? If no, why not? 
 
4.According to program criteria the area should not exceed 20 m per person 






The financial side of the 
housing issue proves to be the 
most important for IDPs. For 
5. Do you consider 50% compensation as 
sufficient in connection to the income limit 
required by the program? 
5. The state program Affordable housing can provide 50% compensation of the 
new housing price. Would you be able to afford to purchase a new apartment 





(IV) instance, according to studies 
of displaced persons in 
Canada, the cost of housing 
was of prime importance for 
about 40% of respondents 
compared to other criteria 
(Danso, 2002). 
 
6. What is the source of your 50% part? For 
instance, personal savings, bank credit, funding 
borrowed from relatives. How difficult was it for 
you to obtain this funding? 
 
you need? 
6. What would be most probably the source of your part of funding? For 
instance, personal savings, bank credit, funding borrowed from relatives. 
Would it be difficult for you to obtain this funding with your current income? 
7. The program requires participants to not have an income more than three 
times the average monthly salary per family member, which is approximately 





The application process may 
be too difficult or long. The 
United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) survey 
in 1996 concluded that often 
the time spent on the 
application process was 
viewed by citizens as 
substantially burdening and 
this was hindering the 
program (Hanratty, 2006: 
604). 
   
7.Was it difficult to gather all the necessary 
documents? If not, with which documents did the 
problem arise and why? 
8. How long was (is) the waiting queue before 
getting the decision? 
9. How in general would you estimate the process 
of applying for this financial aid? What were the 
easiest and the most difficult steps of the process? 
10. (If applicable). Why do you think your 
application was not approved? 
 
 




IDPs may be satisfied with 
their housing conditions even 
if it’s not their property, 
rather rented or borrowed 
(Wu, 2004) 
11. (For those who got the assistance) Are you 
happy with your current housing? Why yes/no? 
11. (For those who did not) Are you happy with 
your current housing? Why yes/no? Would you 
want to reapply for the program? 
8. Are you happy with your current housing? Why yes/no? Would you want to 






3.2 Sample size and characteristics 
The interview sample consists of 24 Ukrainian IDPs. The interviews were conducted in 
the period from 15th to 30th April 2020. Two groups of people were interviewed in order 
to fully grasp the experience of a displaced person’s situation: 
1. Those who were participants of the program (including people who received 
assistance and purchased housing, are in a waiting queue for the decision or got a 
refusal). 13 interviews were conducted in general. After the interview 12 was 
conducted, additional one interview did not contribute any new information. 
2. Those who did not participate in the program. 11 interviews were conducted in 
general. Most of the information was repeated after the interview №8 and during 
the tenth interview the saturation was finally reached. 
The process of selection was based on the convenience sampling principle (looking for 
volunteers who are willing and able to participate) during the first phase, because the 
interviewer has no access to governmental records of IDPs and participants of Affordable 
Housing. Thus, when randomization is not possible, this nonprobability sampling is the 
only choice (Etikan, 2016).  
However, to make a sample more resemblant of general IDPs community in Ukraine, 
different interviewees were chosen (for the variability of results and further representation 
of the sample): different ages, сonflict zones and currently living in different regions of 
Ukraine. The number of interviews is explained by reaching the point of data saturation. 
It was reached during the 22nd interview and two more were conducted to ensure the 
repetition of information. 
First respondents were recruited through Facebook. This particular social network was 
chosen for the research because according to a survey by the Socis Center for Social 
Research in March 2019, 70.9% of respondents in Ukraine use Facebook while only 
32.8% of respondents used Instagram and 5.9% - Twitter. The share of Russian 
networking sites is also small Odnoklassniki (10.2%), VKontakte (9.1%), and My 
World@Mail.Ru (2.3%), because these websites are officially banned for Ukrainian 





The researcher had in her disposal a full list of all significant Facebook groups created by 
IDPs in Facebook. This list containing information about 586 public pages (with one 
thousand participants at least) was provided by the NGO “Boost”, an organisation that 
aims to help displaced people by informing them about all the assistance programs or 
projects provided both by state and non-state actors. Since posting a recruitment message 
for finding respondents in all of these groups was neither possible or necessary, the list 
was filtered leaving 10 most significant pages (with 20 thousand participants or more). 
Among those groups were pages for IDPs of all 24 regions of Ukraine. 
Interviews were conducted online, due to travel restrictions imposed on Ukraine because 
of high coronavirus rates. Apart from being cheaper (in terms of used resources) and more 
easily arranged, online interviews as a method of qualitative research have several 
important advantages. Firstly, they are more convenient for respondents than offline 
interviews (Gruber, 2008), because people spend less time on them with no need to get 
to the place of interview - it can be done right in front of their personal computer. Thus, 
by using this method, a researcher decreases the probability of refusal to participate in the 
study and can reach not only respondents who have much free time, but also those who 
have less of it and would not agree to be interviewed offline. 
Moreover, since the respondents are located in a familiar environment, the process of 
interview is more convenient for them in emotional terms. According to Joinson (2001), 
participants reveal more personal info in a set of computer-mediated communication in 
comparison to traditional face-to-face dialogue. That can happen because they have the 
protection of this visual anonymity. This is crucially important for this research because 
the questionnaire is asking questions connected to financial situations in the families of 
IDPs and this tends to be a rather sensitive information for them. 
Thus, after the interviewees were recruited, they were given a choice to make interviews 
in a preferred by them setting: 
1) via video call in Zoom, Skype, Messenger or other applications preferred by a 
participant 





3) a chat in Messenger 
Before conducting interviews, the interviewees were sent the consent form to generally 
inform them about the purpose of the research and ensure that their personal information 
would not be shared. Most importantly, the consent form would state again that their 
answers would be quoted without mentioning their name guaranteeing anonymity. It was 
сomposed using the sample provided for a free access on the website of The University 
of Edinburgh. The consent form is presented in Appendix 1. 
The interviews were conducted mostly in Ukrainian. The copies of the consent form as 
well as questionnaires translated in that language are provided in the appendixes. It is 
important to note, that the author asked interviewees if the usage of Ukrainian was 
convenient for them. In case it was not, the author proceeded in Russian language. 
After the first volunteers were interviewed, snowball sampling was also used, asking 
interviewees to share contacts of other IDPs they know. This was a good choice of 
strategy, because displaced persons had other displaced acquaintances and this helped to 
reach few people from a non-Facebook audience and people who do follow Facebook 
groups of IDPs. 
3.3 Methodology limitations of sampling and recruitment 
Firstly, not reaching an audience of non-Facebook users enough or, more importantly, 
people who do not use the Internet may be considered the main limitation of this research. 
Because, according to World Bank data, only 59% of Ukrainians use the Internet 
regularly. Moreover, the distribution of users by age has a significant bias towards young 
people. 
However, this is not so significant for the case of this research, because most IDPs are 
young people. The average age of a Ukrainian displaced person is 36 while the average 
age of the general Ukrainian population is 40 (IOM, 2019). Moreover, older people not 
only migrate from a conflict region less frequently, they have a bigger probability to 





the population is less likely to participate in housing programs even if they are offered an 
opportunity. 
More importantly, IDPs apply for housing programs not individually but with their whole 
household usually, because 76% of displaced people live in families of two people and 
more or not alone (IOM, 2019). Thus, when the interviews with respondents were 
conducted, they were talking not only about their personal experience but also the 
experience of the whole household participating in the program and wanting to find a new 
home. 
To conclude, this research design is not without flaws, but it is reasonably valid to 
accomplish its main goal - discover what happens inside the “black box” of housing 
programmes’ application processing (mechanism of their functioning), the reasons why 
some candidates get assistance and others do not, and why many IDPs are not 







4. Findings from the interviews 
This chapter presents the results of the interviews. It will start by discussing hypotheses 
that were not supported which is followed by the overview and analysis of hypotheses 
that were confirmed to be true. 
4.1 Disproved hypotheses 
With the results from the interviews, two hypotheses were not confirmed: hypothesis one 
(H1) and hypothesis four (H4). This subchapter is discussing them one by one. 
4.1.1 H1: Lack of knowledge hindering AHP availability 
The H1 states that the Affordable housing program availability is hindered by the lack of 
knowledge among the target group of this program. That would mean that the 
informational campaign around the program had failed to inform enough IDPs in Ukraine. 
However, only three interviewed IDPs that were non-participants of the program (out of 
eleven interviewed in general) have never heard about the Affordable Housing Program. 
The other eight have heard about AHP or even visited State Fund website in search for 
more information. For example, this is how several of them answered the first interview 
question “Do you know anything about state housing programs for IDPs? Have you ever 
heard about the Affordable housing program?”: 
“Of course, I have. I remember in 2016 or 2017, when it was introduced, there was 
huge hype around it in the media. Every newspaper, every page on Facebook 
connected to the IDPs issue was talking about it. I decided to apply, but there was a 
particular list of developer companies approved by the Cabinet to sell housing under 
this program [At the beginning of the program, there was a list of developers who 
had governmental contracts to provide housing for this program. This feature was 
simplified in 2018 - author's note]. I looked them up on the Internet and none of them 
was building residential houses in my city. So I couldn't apply.” (Interviewee 1) 
“Yes, I know this program. I know about all the programs provided by the State Fund. 





conditions of all the programs. I thought about applying but the queue was incredibly 
long and I don’t want to be stuck in the bureaucracy of procedure for nothing.” 
(Interviewee 18) 
Moreover, none of interviewees answered that they did not know about any government 
assistance programs. In contrast, the interviewees often knew about programs provided 
not only by the central government, but also local authorities in their city or village. Three 
of them even were participants of other assistance programs.       
“I don't know the details of this particular program, but I applied for the program of 
soft loans. My turn never came. I'm still waiting” (Interviewee 4) 
“I’m currently in the queue waiting for my turn in the program provided by Kyiv City 
State Administration. Although it is not only for IDPs. It is for all the people in need 
of better living conditions.” (Interviewee 17) 
“I lived with my children in a Collective center for IDPs for over a year [Temporary 
housing program – author’s note].” (Interviewee 22) 
Thus, IDPs are rather well-informed on the assistance program available in their region. 
In fact, while recruiting displaced people for the interview with the second questionnaire 
(for non-participants), on two occasions they turned out to be participants-people who 
applied several years ago just forgot the name of the program:      
“Oh, so you're talking about the "50-50" program. I didn't know it was called that. 
Yes, I even sent documents to them. They put me in queue for some two thousandth 
position in order. I realized that it would take a long time to reach me and even 
stopped checking it." (Interviewee 7) 
To conclude, IDPs in Ukraine generally know about the existence of assistance programs 
provided by the central government or local authorities. They often choose not to 
participate because of requirements difficult to meet or long waiting queue for assistance. 





because it is a program well-known and discussed in IDP community, social media groups 
and media materials. 
4.1.2 H4: Absence of need for private housing 
The second disproved hypothesis is that IDPs do not participate in the assistance program 
because they do not need or want to purchase housing (H4) - they may be satisfied with 
renting on their own funds as a better option considering their individual circumstances, 
and thus do not need the help of the program. However, out of all 24 interviews (both 
participants and non-participants of AHP) only one responded that she does not want to 
purchase accommodation: 
“House, apartment, such expensive real estate binds and burdens. I prefer mobility. 
I can decide to move and find a new job at any time. So, I don't want to buy a home.” 
(Interviewee 13) 
The other 23 interviewees expressed a desire to purchase housing, even though they were 
from diverse demographic strata having different financial ability. They are often even 
ready to experience difficulties in order to get private housing (like moving to a new 
location): 
“Hopefully, I will be able to buy housing in five years on my own. I don’t hope now 
for any assistance form the state, rely only on myself. I think about investing in a 
building project and not purchasing ready apartment, even though it may be risky 
[There is an issue with fraud developers in Ukraine. They collect the funding form 
investors, start building and then go bankrupt or do not finish the housing. For 
example, in Kyiv, there are 41 such buildings in the List of problematic objects of 
housing construction by Kyiv City State Administration (2021)]” (Interviewee 7) 
“Eventually I will buy my housing with assistance or without it. Maybe I will save 
some funding while working here in Kyiv and will move to a cheaper location to 






Even young single people, who are believed to be more mobile, expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the option of renting an apartment explaining this with different 
reasons (high prices, discrimination from landlords, etc.): 
 “My rent is way too high. It takes up to 40% of my income, which is unacceptable. I 
cannot make any savings because of that.” (Interviewee 11) 
“I am fed up with landlords demanding to know every detail of my biography every 
time I move to a new flat. It is none of their business where I come from. Even several 
realtors refused to work with me when they heard that I’m from Donbass” 
(Interviewee 19) 
This was rather expected and in accordance with general trends in Ukraine. According to 
UNICEF survey of young Ukrainians between the ages of 18 and 34, 82% would like to 
obtain better housing and almost 57% of them would like to buy it while only 26% - to 
rent (2019). Although this survey applies to all Ukrainian young people, there is no reason 
to expect that the position of young IDPs on the topic would be different. 
To conclude, IDPs definitely choose the option of private housing over the option of 
renting. They are so highly motivated to buy an apartment that they are often ready to 
experience difficulties and risks while pursuing this goal. That is why the hypothesis that 
there is no need in purchasing housing and, thus, AHP was refuted, as well as the first 
hypothesis on the lack of knowledge about AHP. In the end, they were proved to be 
wrong, which is one more piece of evidence in favour of other supported hypotheses of 
the research. 
4.2 Supported hypotheses 
This subchapter is discussing two hypotheses that were supported (H2 and H3). 
4.2.1 H3: administrative procedures hindering AHP availability 
The third hypothesis (H3) stated that the availability of the program may be hindered by 
the administrative issues regarding the procedure of getting assistance. Indeed, the 





significantly underestimated the relevance of this category of issues. In general, there 
were three groups of administrative issues identified in the interviews: 1) related to 
document collection, 2) document submission, and 3) waiting queues for the assistance. 
This subchapter is describing them one by one. 
4.2.1.1 Documents collection 
The first group of issues arises before the participants of the program when they collect 
the required documents for the application. The first document mentioned in the list 
required by the State Fund is a certificate of IDP status (“довідка про статус ВПО” in 
ukr.). The problem is that not every displaced person has this certificate because not every 
IDP applies for it. This may sound paradoxical, because IDP status provides access to 
many governmental and non-governmental assistance programs as well as benefits in 
paying utility bills, studies, etc. However, despite these benefits, IDPs often do not apply 
to get the certificate confirming their status. Out of 11 interviewed IDPs that were not 
AHP participants, two interviewees mentioned not having this certificate. This is how 
they explained this fact: 
“I don't want to obtain an IDP status. I don't think that the state should divide its 
citizens on the basis of displacement. The only document that I willing to provide to 
verify my identity is passport.” (Interviewee 11) 
“When I tried to apply for this certificate, they [meaning the local Department of 
Labor and Social Protection - author's note] asked me to provide a lot of documents 
including my university diploma, driver's license and many others. According to the 
law all I need to submit are my passport and identification code. They also kept 
asking about why I needed this certificate and what programs I was going to apply 
to. I didn't like this visit.” (Interviewee 5) 
There is a significant problem of discrimination on the basis of displacement status in 
Ukraine: 7% of IDPs have reported they have experienced discrimination in different 
spheres (while getting a job, housing or public services, etc.) (IOM, 2017). Discrimination 





and/or unfair treatment. Also, among those IDPs who have experienced discrimination in 
Ukraine, 31% report that they feel this attitude on the part of civil servants (Kravtsiv, 
2017). Thus, the fear of discrimination may be the main reason for the lack of aspiration 
to apply for the IDP status. Obviously, that is a bigger macro-level issue that should be 
addressed by the general state policy on displacement. It unlikely can be addressed on the 
State Fund and Affordable housing program level. 
The second problematic document to obtain is the income statement. First of all, there is 
a significant problem of unofficial employment in Ukraine. According to the report by 
the State Statistics Service in 2020, 20% of the total employed population aged from 15 
to 70 work unofficially in Ukraine. As a result, not only is this part of the population not 
protected with labour rights, it is also restricted in its ability to apply for programs like 
Affordable Housing, because the State Fund requires confirmation from the applicant that 
he or she is in a financial position able to provide 50% of the new housing price. Five 
people out of those 24 interviewed reported that they have unofficial income: 
“When I was at the meeting at the State Fund organised to explain the program 
requirements, they told me that receiving financial assistance is highly unlikely in 
case we don't have any official income.” (Interviewee 23) 
“I wanted to apply for the program and planned to provide my 50% with a bank 
credit. However, they refused to give me the loan, because my official salary is rather 
small and I get most of my income “in the envelope” [this is a usual Ukrainian 
proverb to describe the unofficial part of the salary that is not taxed and usually 
given in cash - author's note]. (Interviewee 8) 
This is also a macro-level issue that cannot be dealt with on a program level. However, it 
is still an issue interfering with the successful implementation of the program. That is 
why it is mentioned here. 
On the other hand, there is a problem regarding document collection that can be addressed 
on the micro-level of program design or implementation. The issue is that the application 





application is submitted. After that, an applicant gets in queue and waits for their turn to 
get the assistance. However, this usually takes several years. The issue is that funding for 
the program is rather limited (as of 2021, funding comes only from local budgets and not 
from the state). Thus, by the time when the turn finally comes to the applicant, documents 
submitted before are no longer valid and all of them need to be resubmitted. Moreover, 
four interviewed IDPs who received the 50% funding mentioned that they were given 
only several days to collect an updated package of documents: 
“When the State Fund called us and said that our turn had come, they also clarified 
that the documents need to be submitted in the nearest future, otherwise the queue 
will move on. We collected documents in three days and found an apartment in a 
day.” (Interviewee 20) 
“During those couple of days, while we were looking for housing under the terms of 
the program and documents, we got very nervous. Everything had to be done 
quickly.” (Interviewee 15) 
These two applicants received assistance in December 2019, when the State Fund finally 
acquired funding provided by the Law of Ukraine "On the State Budget of Ukraine for 
2019". The issue was that funds had not been transferred to the Fund account earlier 
during the year. Only after IDPs organised the series of protests (Dniprovska, 2019) – 
several demonstrations in Kyiv in front of Cabinet of Ministers – were funds finally 
transferred and needed to be spent before the end of the year, otherwise it would have to 
be returned to the budget. Thus, the process of assistance distribution needed to be 
accelerated. 
The need for a quick second submission can be extremely inconvenient for participants. 
For instance, several interviewees who have participated in AHP are entrepreneurs and 
getting the income statement is a more difficult for them: 
“By law, a certificate of income for entrepreneurs is issued no later than fifteen days 
from the date of receipt of the application. It usually takes 10 days for the Tax Service 





“We were given 5 days to collect documents. I didn’t have time to get a certificate of 
income. I submitted a document about the annual turnover of my company so that 
they would understand my approximate income. But the Fund counted this turnover 
as an income and we were not given the assistance. They said that our family exceeds 
the income limit, which is prescribed in the terms of the program. This is not the case, 
though.” (Interviewee 14) 
Thus, people needed to be given the appropriate amount of time to collect the documents. 
Otherwise, it may result not only in stress but even in the unfair refusal to enrol them into 
the program. 
4.2.1.2 Document submission 
The second category of administrative issues of the program is related to document 
submission. First of all, until April 2018, there was no possibility to submit documents 
electronically using a State Fund email or website. To submit the application, IDPs 
needed to make an appointment and then physically arrive at the office of the Fund. 
However, due to the increased attention to the program in 2018 (after the first successful 
year of its introduction in 2017) and the fact that there is only one regional agency of the 
State Fund in every region, these offices were unable to accept all interested IDPs without 
queues. To solve this issue the system of queueing was introduced. People could come to 
the regional agency and get a ticket indicating on what day and at what time they are 
scheduled to have an appointment and submit documents (State Fund, 2021).   
However, this did not help the situation. Based on the interviews, people tried to arrive at 
the State Fund office before its opening because the number of issued coupons every day 
was limited and they were all taken by visitors in a few minutes after the office opening. 
To avoid conflicts with each other, people started to form new queues – but this time, the 
queues to get the coupons themselves. One interviewed IDP described this process as 
follows: 
“Every morning the terminal issued 23 coupons for an appointment to submit 





in Viber [messaging application commonly used in Ukraine - author's note] where 
we made a list of who will come and take a coupon each morning. If new people were 
coming to the office in the morning, we explained to them that there is a list and we 
will add them to the chat.” (Interviewee 19) 
This situation is rather paradoxical. People were creating a list to get into another list with 
a coupon telling them about their listed appointment. This required participants to not 
only organise their personal documentation but also to spend time on organising other 
people and this queue. This situation illustrates that the application procedure was 
organised rather poorly, because this system designed by applicants themselves was in 
action until April 2018. 
In April 2018, the State Fund finally started to accept applications through the e-mail, 
which greatly facilitated the process and life of the applicants. Documents can still be 
submitted through the appointment and visit to the office, but it seems from the interviews 
and other data analysed that people rarely use this way. At least, for this research, it was 
not possible to find participants who, after April 2018, went to submit documents to the 
office. 
However, there was one respondent who expressed distrust in the State Fund managing 
the application of documents:  
“You see, in this program, those who submitted documents earlier receive assistance 
first. Previously, when this process was controlled by the applicants themselves, 
everything was transparent. Everyone knew who would have what queue. And now 
the documents are sent to the email and the Fund itself creates a queue. It seems to 
me that there may be corruption risks in this.” (Interviewee, 14) 
With the exception of this one comment, the rest of the AHP participants rate the 
possibility of electronic submission of documents as convenient and absolutely necessary.  






4.2.1.3 Waiting queue for assistance 
The third group of administrative problems related to the program are issues regarding 
the long waiting queue for the assistance. After the documents are collected and 
submitted, people get their number in the queue and wait until their turn for assistance 
comes. Thus, the first problem is that this queue is long. Out of 13 IDP participants of the 
program interviewed, nine are still waiting for their turn. Those four who already got 
assistance waited for at least two years before it happened. This is how one of them 
described the process of waiting: 
“I no longer hoped that we would receive this help. When you're the 500th in the 
queue, the likelihood that it will come to you is not so great. But over the years, the 
economic situation of people changes. Many who first submitted documents and 
expected to be able to buy an apartment change their minds when it comes to their 
turn. I guess we were lucky”. (Interviewee 11) 
This comment illustrates another unfortunate result of the long cycle of participation in 
the program - the change in the financial ability of the participants. At the moment of 
application, they have a job, savings or the support of relatives, in other words, the 
capacity to pay for the new housing. After years of waiting, their financial situation may 
drastically change. This was a reason for refusal in assistance for several respondents: 
“Two years ago, I had a stable job and some savings. I could afford to buy an 
apartment. However, this year I have lost a job because of the pandemic and savings 
are being spent. I am no longer in a position to purchase housing.” (Interviewee 16) 
“I was tired of waiting so together with my parents we bought a house in a village. 
I'm originally from a big city, so I'm not happy about this location. But this is better 
than waiting until inflation eats all of our funding. Now I own a living space and am 
no longer eligible for the program.” (Interviewee 9) 
Finally, this long queue may be one of the main factors discouraging IDPs from applying. 
They view the queue on the State Fund website (it is provided in the open access in order 





still waiting for the assistance who applied several years ago. Several non-participant 
respondents answered that they are not applying for the assistance programs because “it's 
useless” and they believe that their turn will never come: 
“A couple of years ago, I monitored the situation with housing programs. I went to 
the State Fund website, found out all the conditions, and looked at the speed of the 
queue. The budget is small, the queue is way too long, it is unlikely to get help, and 
the process itself is very laborious. What is the point of submitting a load of 
documents when you don't know if the program will still be financed in several years. 
It's like winning the lottery” (Interviewee 10) 
To conclude, there were three most important administrative issues groups related to the 
program according to the interviewees: 1) those connected to document collection 
(obtaining IDP certificate and income statement, doing document collection twice and in 
a short period of time), 2) those connected to document submission (the need to submit 
documents through an offline appointment) and 3) those connected to waiting queue for 
getting the assistance (mainly that it is very long).  
Only one issue out of this five is solved as of May 2021 - the electronic submission of 
documents was introduced. However, issues connected to income statements and IDP 
certificates cannot be solved on the micro-level of the State Fund (by public officials who 
work there and are responsible for the implementation of the program). They are the result 
of larger scale issues in Ukraine, in particular, rates of unofficial employment and 
discrimination of IDPs. On the other side, the rest issues can be fully or at least partially 
dealt with on the micro-level of the program implementation. Possible solutions are 
described in the final chapter before the conclusions. 
4.2.2 H2: criteria of the AHP hindering its availability 
The second hypothesis (H2) of this research was that financial criteria of the Affordable 
housing program are hindering its availability. This hypothesis was supported during the 
interviews. Moreover, even if a non-financial criterion was judged as not convenient by 





the accommodation purchased through the Affordable Housing should be newly built. 
This is not a financial requirement, but a spatial one. However, many interviewed IDPs 
considered this requirement to be a burdening one because the final prices of 
accommodation on the first-hand housing market (including its furnishing and equipping) 
are much higher than on the second-hand market.  
However, during the interviews, some other criteria not related to finances turned out to 
be also influencing the experience of participation in the program. Thus, this subchapter 
proceeds as follows. Firstly, there is a discussion on the financial criteria of the program 
and their easiness to be met. Secondly, there is a discussion on other program criteria that 
were discovered to be important for IDPs. 
4.2.2.1 The financial requirements 
There are three financial criteria strictly defined by the program conditions (State Fund, 
2021): 
1. The average monthly income per family member does not exceed three times the 
average monthly salary in their region (which is approximately 33 thousand UAH 
(980 EUR) if to calculate based on the average salary in Ukraine). 
2. The price of new housing of their choice does not exceed a set marginal cost, 
which is defined by the program and depends on the region. 
3. The applicants should be able to pay 50% of the cost themselves.   
The first criterion was the easiest one to meet for the interviewed IDPs. In fact, all 24 
interviewees fall under this criterion. The average income in the IDP family is around 
2700 UAH per person (IOM, 2019), which is just a little more than the living wage in 
Ukraine (2270 UAH). Displaced people are the most financially restricted part of the 
population with only 48% being employed. Thus, this requirement is not hindering the 
availability of the program at all. 
The second criteria, on the other hand, became a serious obstacle for the half of the 





“The real estate prices are much higher in real life than the limits set by the program. 
Especially if you live in a big city. Note that prices may be really different in one 
region depending on a particular location and infrastructure there. Talking about 
my experience, I live in Kyiv. But if my turn for assistance comes, I will buy 
accommodation in Obukhiv or something like that [satellite city of Kyiv - author's 
note].” (Interviewee, 5) 
“When we were looking for the appropriate flat according to program criteria, we 
understood that our options were rather limited. Only two developers in my city had 
the prices falling under the limit of Affordable housing. So, we didn't have much 
choice.” (Interviewee, 3) 
To illustrate this issue, it would be indicative to demonstrate an example: out of all the 
cities in Ukraine, the biggest number of IDPs is living in Kyiv (approximately 170 
thousand). According to program requirements, the price of one square meter in Kyiv 
should not exceed 15 465 UAH. In comparison, the average market price of one square 
meter in a newly built accommodation in the capital is 29 500 UAH as of April 2021 
(LUN, 2021). In contrast, prices in the aforementioned Obukhiv start from 12 000 UAH, 
which makes this city a possible choice in case of the application for the program. 
However, Kyiv is a rather extreme example, because it is a capital with much higher 
average prices. Residents of other regions may not find this requirement of the program 
so difficult to be fulfilled. For instance, in another regional center Ivano-Frankivsk city, 
the program sets a limit of 11 898 UAH per one square meter, while the real market prices 
in that city start from 7 800 UAH (LUN, 2021). However, only approximately 3 600 IDPs 
live there (IOM, 2019). 
Finally, the third criterion of ability to pay 50% independently received  a mixed feedback 
from the interviewees. On the one hand, they estimate this criterion as an adequate and 
legitimate one: 
“50% is a good compensation. It’s more than enough. I mean that the state doesn’t 
owe you anything. This is already a great deal.” (Interviewee 24) 





On the other hand, collecting their 50% was (or would be) difficult for almost all 
interviewed IDPs. Only one recipient of funding from AHP answered that she simply 
used her savings while others needed (or would need) to take a loan or save for at least 
several years to assemble their 50%. Most IDPs (meaning applicants who got the AHP 
funding) used or plan to use their savings to purchase housing: 
“We collected our share from all possible sources. We used our savings, the savings 
of our parents, borrowed funding from our friends, and even sold the car. Anything 
not to take out a bank loan.” (Interviewee, 5) 
The reason why IDPs find it so difficult to collect their share is the unavailability of bank 
loans. Firstly, because, according to the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), at the end of 
December 2019, the interest rate on loans in hryvnia for households averaged 35% per 
annum. For comparison, according to the European Central Bank, in countries within the 
Eurozone the average interest rates for businesses and individuals was between 1.5 and 
1.6% per annum. The difference is more than tenfold. This situation is due to the fact that 
the discount rate of the NBU is high, the level of risk in the Ukrainian economy is 
significant, and banks run the risk of entrusting funding to the borrowers. Thus, bank 
credits are too expensive, especially for such financially vulnerable groups as IDPs. Soft 
loans, on the other hand, are not available for the participants of the program, because, 
according to the rules of enrolment, an IDP cannot participate in two housing assistance 
programs at the same time. 
Moreover, IDPs may be refused in getting a loan by banks because of discrimination 
based on the displaced status. The problem of discrimination was described previously in 
subchapter 4.2.1 on administrative issues, but it is also relevant here. One interviewed 
IDP mentioned that they experienced this situation while trying to get a loan in a big 
Ukrainian bank: 
“I have a perfect credit history. I repeatedly took loans from this bank for the 
purchase of household appliances and always paid everything on time. I also have a 





purchasing housing, the bank was vague in wording at first, and then bluntly stated: 
"Because you are a displaced person." (Interviewee, 12) 
Relying on savings, on the other hand, is also difficult, because in two years of waiting 
inflation and changes in exchange rates, as well as in house prices, can change the real 
value of these savings in terms of the housing that can be bought with them: 
“When we were informed that we could buy housing under the program, we 
transferred our savings from the dollar to the hryvnia. Not long before that, the 
national currency had seriously strengthened and, thus, we lacked several tens of 
thousands to buy an apartment. I had to urgently borrow funding from a friend” 
(Interviewee 6) 
“When I applied for the program, I hoped to sell my old housing in territories not 
controlled by Ukraine. I was looking for a buyer for a long time, while housing prices 
in these regions kept falling and falling, because people left and left their homes. 
Now I don't think I can sell it.” (Interviewee, 18) 
These responses illustrate again that the participation cycle needs to be shortened. While 
people are waiting for years to get assistance, their financial ability to provide 50% of 
housing price may change drastically. 
4.2.2.2 Non-financial requirements 
There are five non-financial criteria of the AHP (State Fund, 2021): 
1. Applicants should be registered as citizens in need of better living conditions 
(Ukraine has a single state register of such citizens). 
2. Their ownership of living space should not exceed 13.65 m2 (excluding housing 
located in the temporarily occupied territory). 
3. The area of a new accommodation does not exceed 21 m2 per family member 
combined with additional 10.5 m2 per the whole family. 
4. The new housing should be newly built so that participants get first-hand property 





5. In case the applicant wants to build a house and not purchase the apartment, the 
construction period should not exceed 12 months from the date of the contract 
signed with the State Fund. 
The first two requirements were, based on the answers of interviewees, relatively easy for 
IDPs to mee. Registration as a citizen in need of better living condition is easy in case a 
person has an IDP status and no ownership of living space. To register, an IDP needs to 
apply to the local government at the place of residence. Thus, since only 12% of IDPs 
were able to purchase their own housing after the relocation (IOM, 2019) and they do not 
own a living space, the first two requirements were not difficult to fulfill. In fact, only 
one respondent answered that she is no longer eligible according to this criterion because 
she bought housing and decided not to wait for the assistance. 
The third criterion of area limit was also not judged by interviewees to be a difficult one 
to fulfil with the exception of single interviewees. If a single person is trying to purchase 
accommodation under the program, the area limit is 31,5 square meters. For instance, the 
average size of apartments in new buildings commissioned in 2020 in Kyiv is 74.9 square 
meters (LUN, 2021). The smallest studio apartments start from 28 square meters at least. 
Thus, it may be difficult for a single IDP to find program-appropriate housing: 
“I turned to the State Fund with a request to clarify how this problem can be solved. 
They replied that I can buy housing that is bigger by the footage. However, for 
everything that will exceed the specified limit, I have to pay myself. 50% is not 
compensated.” (Interviewee 8) 
The fourth requirement stating that the housing should be newly built was the most 
problematic in this group. It was also connected to the financial situation of IDPs. In 
general, second-hand accommodation is approximately 13% more expensive than first-
hand accommodation. Moreover, in the primary market, prices are growing slower than 
in the secondary market (6.9% increase in 2020 in comparison to 9.8%) (LUN, 2021). It 
may look like first-hand accommodation is more affordable for IDPs. However, this is 





“The housing in the new building is completely empty. There are only concrete walls 
and no flooring. When I figured out how much it would cost me to fill the apartment 
with household appliances and furniture, I realized that it would be much cheaper to 
buy secondary housing.” (Interviewee 21) 
There is a second problem connected to the requirement of newly built housing. There 
are always developers building housing in big cities. However, almost half of IDPs in 
Donetsk or Lugansk regions live in small cities or villages (because the main regional 
cities are currently not controlled by Ukraine) (IOM, 2019). In smaller locations, there 
may be a lack or a complete absence of newly built housing in a small city. 
“I live in Irpen. When I was looking for housing according to the program, there 
were only two new buildings in our city that met the criteria of the program. We 
didn't have much choice.” (Interviewee 2) 
“I moved to a small urban-type settlement and at the moment there are no new 
apartment blocks being built here. So, if my turn for assistance from the program 
comes, I will have to move. I'm not sure yet if I will do it. I have parents here, they 
help with the child.” (Interviewee 17) 
Finally, the last non-financial requirement stated that in case the applicant wants to build 
a house, the construction period should not exceed 12 months from the date of the contract 
signed with the State Fund. Unfortunately, the author of this thesis was not able to recruit 
the respondents who built the house using this program assistance. Most possible 
explanation would be that people do not use the AHP to build an accommodation, because 
this is rather a city-oriented program by its design. As mentioned in subchapter 2.3.1 on 
general housing policy principles in Ukraine, there is another program implemented for 
villages and private housing - Own a house (Власний Дім). However, this assumption 
needs to be checked with further research. 
To conclude, some criteria of the Affordable housing program were quite difficult for 
IDPs to fulfil, especially those connected to financial requirements (price limit, 50% 





and the first-hand market requirement may be impossible to be fulfilled by the residents 
of small cities with no new housing being built. 
4.3 Solutions for policy development 
This research has uncovered many problems with the Affordable housing program as well 
as more broad issues of the general housing policy for IDPs in Ukraine. This subchapter 
will describe some possible solutions based on the responses of IDPs as well as the 
experience of other countries described in chapter 2.  
This section will proceed as follows: firstly, based on the results from chapter 2 and 4, I 
provide possible solutions and improvements for the further development of Affordable 
Housing Program. However, the AHP is a part of a bigger housing policy for IDPs. Thus, 
secondly, I will describe possible ways of the general housing policy evolving, and what 
other programs need to be developed to meet all IDPs needs. The possible solutions 
provided in this section could be also be applicable and transferable to other countries 
with the similar situation, context and background. 
4.3.1 Solutions for improving AHP 
First of all, the participation cycle needs to be shortened. As it was described in chapter 
4.2.1.3, the long waiting queue that ensues after the document submission causes many 
negative consequences, starting from the applicant's loss of ability to participate and 
ending with the discouragement of new IDPs to enrol. As of May 2021, most people who 
applied right after the start of the program in 2017 still have not received assistance. 
Such a situation is a result of a lack of finances, since the program has not been provided 
from the state budget since the COVID pandemic started. To solve the issue of queues, 
the financing needs to start again and in larger quantities. The allocation of funding needs 
to happen in time and in full. Situations like at the end of December 2019, when funding 
for the program reached the account of the State Fund almost at the end of the year and 
was not fully distributed among participants resulting in a big return to the central budget 





Moreover, not only the financing should be resumed, the principle for the distribution of 
the funding should be changed. Currently, according to the resolution by the Cabinet of 
Ministers №819 of October 10, 2018, funding should be allocated to the regions in 
proportion to the number of people who live there. However, the number of applicants 
does not correlate with the number of people in the region. For example, almost half of 
the IDPs live in Donetsk or Lugansk regions but there were only 200 applications for the 
program submitted in 2018 in comparison to the general number of 10 000 applications 
(Kalinin, 2018). As a result, too much funding was given to this region, 12 million UAH 
were not used and needed to be returned to the central budget when families in many 
other regions of Ukraine could get this assistance (Kalinin, 2018). Two interviewed AHP 
participants suggested that the principle of finance distribution should be changed in 
proportion to the number of applications submitted in each region rather than the general 
number of the population. 
Apart from the long queue and financial issues, a third group of changes needs to be made 
regarding the program criteria. First of all, the financial criteria should be made more 
appropriate: the price limit needs to be adjusted to the real market prices so that 
participants have a choice when purchasing accommodation and not having few options 
that are falling under the price limit. 
Secondly, the opportunity to apply for several housing programs and participate in them 
at the same time should be considered. As it was explained, bank loans are not available 
for IDPs mostly because they are expensive. Thus, displaced people should have a chance 
to make their 50% by taking a soft 3% loan using another program provided by the State 
Fund. 
Thirdly, the possibility of purchasing second-hand housing needs to be added. 
Approximately half of the respondents interviewed would prefer the secondary housing 
market, because it can offer more options and apartments are usually ready to be inhabited 
right away. Newly built housing may also be a more expensive choice because it needs 





available for the IDPs who are living in small cities with a small or non-existent market 
for newly built real estate. 
Finally, the area limit should be reconsidered for single IDPs who are purchasing housing 
only for themselves. Finding an apartment that is smaller than 31.5 square meters may be 
rather difficult. The current area limit may be one of the reasons why there is a lack of 
young participants in the program. 
In general, all these changes would ensure that the Affordable Housing Program becomes 
more available for IDPs with different types of financial situations as well as place of 
residence and other backgrounds. 
4.3.2 Solutions for improving general housing policies for IDPs 
During this research, many macro-level problems in the integration of IDPs and housing 
policy were identified. They cannot be dealt with on the micro-level of the Affordable 
Housing Program by the State Fund officials or with changes to AHP´s design by the 
Cabinet of Ministers, but there are possible solutions for those issues. 
Firstly, several interviewees stated that they do not have an IDP status officially. This 
illustrates the general problem with registration as a displaced person in Ukraine. Right 
from the beginning, the answer of Ukrainian authorities to the mass internal migration 
was rather belated. The registration of internally displaced persons officially started only 
in October 2014 with the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers (MSP, 2021). Thus, the 
problem with statistics is that not all IDPs were registered by the authorities. Therefore, 
the actual number of IDPs is difficult to estimate and it may be higher. At the same time, 
proper registration and statistics on IDPs is extremely important to avoid a situation like 
in Moldova, where monitoring of displaced people was not conducted properly and the 
government could not estimate the scale of the problem to implement needed policies 
(UNHCR, 2004). As a result, displaced people were left with the problem on their own, 
forced by these difficulties to return to the conflict zone or leave the country. 
One possible solution for this issue would be to introduce an electronic process of getting 





physically come and apply in the local office of Social service at the place of actual 
residence. Paper documents, application written by hand and waiting queues for an 
appointment, - all these factors make this procedure inconvenient and difficult. In 
contrast, the experience of implementing electronic submission of documents for 
Affordable housing illustrates that this can simplify the procedure significantly. 
Secondly, a substantive issue of discrimination on the basis of displacement status was 
uncovered. IDPs reported discrimination taking place when interacting with civil 
servants, getting banking services and, most importantly, renting apartment. In fact, four 
respondents answering the last question about general satisfaction with their 
accommodation indicated this problem. They were refused by landlords, realtors, 
required to pay a larger than a usual safe deposit, submit more documents than usual, etc.  
However, this issue is not easily solved only by a policy decision: it takes time to change 
stereotypes and shatter stigma. However, the governmental policy should be designed to 
answer this challenge too. 
Finally, the analysis of this research indicates that the financial situation of IDPs is most 
often rather difficult. The average monthly income of a Ukrainian IDP (UAH 3,631 or 
100 EUR per family member) is significantly smaller than the all-Ukrainian figure (UAH 
5,398 or 160 EUR per family member) (IOM, 2019). Half of the non-participant 
respondents answered that they cannot afford to purchase housing even with 50% 
compensation, at least not now. All these facts demonstrate that the housing policy for 
IDPs needs a diversification of options. Three out of four housing programs have the goal 
of purchasing accommodation by a displaced family while only 2% of IDPs are using the 
possibilities of the fourth temporary housing program due to the limited and poor-quality 
housing stock. For instance, thousands of Ukrainian IDPs starting from 2014 still live in 
the temporary module townships that were designed for no more than three years of 
residence (Rzheutska, 2020). 
In comparison, as described in more detail in chapter 2.2., approximately half of IDPs in 
Azerbaijan and Georgia were provided with a place in Collective Centers. The quality of 





was better than not having any options and returning to the conflict zone. In fact, almost 
20% of Ukrainian IDPs had to return home (IOM, 2019). The main reason for the return 
is the availability of housing there and the absence of need to pay rent. 
Most importantly, for the aforementioned policy changes to happen, there needs to be 
political will. As Golda studying Georgian case concluded, “the political will to improve 
living conditions for the displaced” is extremely important for the success of housing 
policy (2009, 55). The fact that, as of May 2021, AHP as well as other assistance housing 
programs for IDPs are not financed from the state budget proves that housing for 
displaced people is not a priority issue for policy-makers in Ukraine. 
To summarize all the main findings of this thesis, Table 4 illustrates the housing policies 
of four post-soviet countries (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan) and the final 






Table 4. Housing policies of the four post-Soviet state and a perfected housing policy 
 Georgia  Azerbaijan Moldova Ukraine Possibly best solution 
Presence of IDP 
general/national 
policy 




Collective centers (CC) 
for half IDPs on the 
basis of former industrial 
or commercial buildings, 
former schools and 
kindergartens. Two 
years after the beginning 
of conflict, new districts 
started being built. Other 
were renovated. 
Collective centers for 
half IDPs on the basis of 
former industrial or 
commercial buildings, 
former schools and 
kindergartens. Also, 
new districts with CCs 
were built later. Other 
were renovated. 
ССs as temporary 
options for most 
IDPs on the basis of 





new ССs built. 
Collective centers for 
2% of IDPs on the basis 
of former industrial or 
commercial buildings, 
former schools and 
kindergartens. Some 
CCs were renovated. 
Several new CCs built 
but not enough. 
Temporary housing should be available 
(preferably in large amounts like in 
Georgia and Azerbaijan and not only for 
2% of critical cases like in Ukraine). The 
construction of new CCs should start as 




Often not appropriate for 
long-term living. 
Location on the outskirts 
of cities, rural areas, 
often close to conflict 
zone 
Often not appropriate 
for long-term living. 
Location on the outskirts 
of cities, rural areas, 
often close to conflict 
zone 
Often not appropriate 
for long-term living. 
Location on the 
outskirts of cities, 
rural areas 
Often not appropriate 
for long-term living. 
Location on the outskirts 
of cities, rural areas 
CCs should be renovated to be suitable as 
long-term option. Should be located in the 
areas of economic activity and with good 
infrastructure (to enable employment). 






program of housing 
vouchers for purchasing 
housing 
СCs privatized. No permanent 
housing program 
1 AHP 
2 Soft loans 
3 Own a house  
Programs allowing to purchase housing 
should be present (preferably different 
options like in Ukraine). However, they 
are rather expensive for the state budget. 
Option of CCs privatization сan be a good 
solution if the CCs satisfy the conditions 
mentioned higher. 
The result of policy Isolation and 
marginalization of those 
living in CCs. 
Integration of the rest 
Isolation and 
marginalization of those 
living in CCs. 
Integration of the rest 
Further emigration. 
Integration of those 
few left 
Isolation of those living 
in CCs. Integration of 
others 
Different types of housing programs 
available for IDPs with different financial 
abilities. Integration of all IDPs 





To conclude, the Ukrainian experience described in this thesis supports previous findings 
on the factors of the success of housing policy for IDPs in Georgia and other countries. 
Displaced people do need private ownership for housing, but different housing programs 








After the occupation of Crimea and the war in Donbass started in 2014, Ukraine ranks in 
the top ten countries in the world by the number of internally displaced people (IDPs). 
Although many countries in a similar situation have state policies targeting different 
aspects of IDPs, Ukraine has designed a more comprehensive housing policy for IDPs 
than countries like Georgia, Azerbaijan or Moldova: Ukraine provides people with both 
temporary and permanent housing options with four different programs. Despite this fact, 
the policy is not satisfying the needs of IDPs. In surveys, they report experiencing many 
struggles associated with housing issues. 
There have been many thorough scientific studies been done on the topic of IDPs in other 
regions (the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and other). However, the scholarly 
community lacks studies on IDPs issues in post-soviet regions, partly because previous 
conflicts in this region (Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan) did not cause such a big number 
of IDPs. The case of Ukraine, on the other hand, is relatively recent and not studied 
enough because of that. Thus, it is important and suitable for research to fill in these gaps. 
There are several housing programs for IDPs in Ukraine: temporary housing program, 
soft loans program, “Own a House program” (for building houses in a rural area) and the 
“Affordable Housing Program” (AHP), which allows displaced people to buy a new 
apartment with a 50% compensation from the state budget. The last program was chosen 
for the research because of three aspects: firstly, it was one of the most financed programs; 
secondly, it was best suited to the needs of IDPs, because IDPs prefer programs with 
partial compensation of the housing cost over long-term soft loans; thirdly, it posits an 
interesting research puzzle. Despite being best suited to the preferences of IDPs, AHP did 
not have many participants (out of 1,5 million IDPs, only 16,000 are participating; see 
more in chapter 2.3). Thus, the research question arose – what is hindering the success of 
the program, which would manifest itself in the bigger number of participants? 
To answer this research question, a comparative analysis of four post-Soviet countries 
was conducted (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) to identify program design 
factors important for success. Ukrainian AHP did have those factors. Thus, the further 





may not participate in the assistance programs. Four hypotheses were formulated based 
on those theoretical explanations. 
Further research included 24 semi-structured interviews that were conducted with two 
groups of people: 13 with those IDPs who participated in Affordable Housing (received 
the assistance or refusal or are currently in a waiting queue for the decision) and 11 with 
those who have not participated. The first group was asked questions about their 
experience of enrolment. The second group was familiarized with the terms of the 
program and asked if those terms are convenient and if they would be able participate in 
the Affordable Housing. The questionnaire was divided into four parts asking questions 
related to each of four hypotheses. 
H1 stated that there may be a lack of knowledge about the program and that is why IDPs 
do not participate. However, this hypothesis was not supported. Interviewees were well-
informed about the assistance programs provided by the central or local governments.  
H2 stated that program criteria (in particular, those related to financial factors) are the 
main reason why the Affordable housing is not available for many IDPs, because AHP 
requires participants to be able to pay their 50% of housing cost and choose an 
accommodation within a price limit. It was supported - interviewees answered that 
enrolment and purchase was or would not be easy for them financially. The main reasons 
for that were lack of savings and high interest rates on bank loans in Ukraine. Price limits 
of the program were also discovered to be not in accordance with market prices on 
housing. 
Other requirements of the program, non-financial ones, were relatively easily met unless 
they were connected to the financial situation in IDP family. For instance, the program 
requires IDPs to buy newly built housing on a first-hand market. This is a spatial 
requirement rather than financial one. However, many IDPs concluded it to be burdening 
because the final price of such housing (including furnishing and mending) would be 
higher than for a second-hand accommodation. 
H3 stated that administrative procedure of enrollment in AHP may have issues hindering 
its success. This hypothesis was also supported. There were three groups of procedural 





confirming IDP status and income statement, doing document collection twice during the 
enrolment and in a short period of time), 2) related to document submission (the need to 
submit documents through an offline appointment) and 3) those connected to the queue 
for getting the assistance (mainly that it is very long). However, the second issue was 
already dealt with because the program introduced the electronic submission of 
documents. 
H4 was that the program is available, there is nothing hindering its success and IDPs are 
not participating because they have no interest in purchasing housing. It was not 
supported. All interviewees except one expressed the desire and need to purchase 
accommodation. 
Despite all of the drawbacks, the general design of the AHP («take funding – buy 
property») was concluded to be adequate. The Ukrainian AHP has all five elements of 
design that should ensure its success, according to the experience of other post-Soviet 
countries with displacement history. These five elements were derived from the review 
of the cases of Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan. AHP provides IDPs with a 1) durable 
housing solution, 2) private ownership, 3) location and 4) infrastructure on their choice, 
which is one of the 5) preconditions for further integration into the local community. 
Thus, the program should continue to be implemented and developed. 
The further developments of the program should, firstly, prioritize the shortening of the 
participation cycle (the period between submitting application and receiving assistance). 
This development relies on the fact that the program will continue to be financed, in 
bigger amounts and according to proper funding distribution rules.  
Secondly, the program criteria need to be better adapted to the needs of IDPs. Most 
importantly, the program should reconsider price limits according to the market prices 
and allow the purchase of second-hand housing. 
The further development of general housing policy, on the other hand, needs to offer 
diverse solutions – not only purchasing housing but, obtaining temporary housing of good 
quality as well. This would allow different types of IDPs with different financial 
situations to obtain assistance. Because right now many IDPs are in rather restricted 





To conclude, the results of this research can be transferable for the other countries, in 
particular, those in the post-Soviet region, because they have a similar context of conflict, 
internal migration crisis and difficult economic situation. Especially since the issue of 
IDPs housing in Azerbaijan and Georgia remains very relevant and not resolved to the 
result of full successful integration into the local communities. Moreover, the current 
aggravation in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan promises a new wave of 
displacement and the need to deal with housing for IDPs. 
Furthermore, this research can be developed. Only one out of four existent programs for 
IDPs housing was the object of this thesis. Other three, especially the one on temporary 
housing, deserve no less attention, because, as it was concluded in this research, the AHP 
is not suitable for all IDPs, in particularly those experiencing severe financial struggles. 
Thus, only the complete research on all four available programs can give a fully valid 
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Research project title: Factors hindering availability of the housing program for 
internally displaced people in Ukraine 
Research investigator: Samira Abbasova 
The interview will take approximately 40 minutes. It is not anticipated that there are 
any risks associated with your participation, but you have the right to stop the interview 
or withdraw from the research at any time. Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed 
as part of the above research project. Ethical procedures for academic research require 
that interviewees explicitly agree to being interviewed and know how the information 
contained in their interview will be used. 
This consent form is necessary for us to ensure that you understand the purpose of your 
involvement and that you agree to the conditions of your participation. Would you 
therefore read the accompanying information sheet and approve the following: 
• the interview will be recorded and a transcript will be produced 
• you will be sent the transcript and given the opportunity to correct any factual errors 
• the transcript of the interview will be analysed by Samira Abbasova as research 
investigator and quoted in the final text of the research 
• access to the interview transcript will be limited to this person and academic 
colleagues and researchers with whom she might collaborate as part of the research 
process 
• any summary interview content, or direct quotations from the interview, that are made 





so that you cannot be identified, and care will be taken to ensure that other information 
in the interview that could identify yourself is not revealed 
• you can request a copy of the transcript of your interview and may make edits 
• the actual recording will be destroyed after the research is finished   
• any variation of the conditions above will only occur with your further explicit 
approval 
• you are  free to contact the researcher with any questions you may have in the future. 
Please note that by giving this interview, you agree to all the aforementioned 
conditions. 




Consent form (in Ukrainian) 
Бланк згоди 
Назва дослідницького проекту: Фактори, що перешкоджають доступності 
програми житла для внутрішньо переміщених осіб в Україні 
Науковий співробітник: Саміра Аббасова 
Інтерв’ю триватиме приблизно 40 хвилин. Не передбачається, що існують будь-
які ризики, пов’язані з вашою участю, але ви маєте право в будь-який час 
зупинити інтерв’ю або відмовитись від дослідження. Дякуємо, що погодились на 
інтерв’ю в рамках вищезазначеного дослідницького проекту. Етичні процедури 
академічних досліджень вимагають, щоб респонденти чітко погоджувались на 





Ця форма згоди необхідна нам, щоб переконатися, що ви розумієте мету своєї 
участі та погоджуєтесь з умовами вашої участі. Будь ласка, ознайомтеся із 
супровідним інформаційним аркушем, що затвердити таке: 
• інтерв’ю буде записане та буде створено стенограму 
• вам буде надіслано стенограму та надано можливість виправити будь-які 
фактичні помилки 
• стенограма інтерв'ю буде проаналізована Самірою Аббасовою як дослідником 
і цитована в остаточному тексті дослідження 
• доступ до стенограми співбесіди буде обмежений лише для цієї особи та 
академічних колег та дослідників, з якими вона може співпрацювати в рамках 
дослідницького процесу 
• будь-який узагальнений зміст інтерв’ю або прямі цитати з інтерв’ю, доступні в 
академічній публікації чи інших академічних виданнях, будуть анонімізовані, 
щоб ви не могли бути ідентифікованими 
• Ви можете попросити копію стенограми Вашого інтерв’ю і можете внести 
правки 
• фактичний запис буде знищений після закінчення дослідження 
• будь-які зміни вищезазначених умов відбуватимуться лише з вашого 
подальшого прямого дозволу 
• Ви можете зв’язатися з дослідником з будь-яких питань, які можуть виникнути 
в майбутньому. 
Зверніть увагу, що даючи це інтерв’ю, ви погоджуєтесь із усіма 
вищезазначеними умовами. 








Questionnaire for AHP participants in Ukrainian 
1. Де і що ви почули про програму «Доступне житло» вперше? 
2. Чи відповідали Ви всім критеріям, подавши заявку на участь у програмі? Якщо 
ні, яким критеріям ви не відповідали? 
3. Як ви оцінюєте критерії подання заявки на програму? Чи всіх їх легко зустріти? 
Якщо ні, то що вам було важко виконати? 
4. Чи важко знайти житло (або створити проект будівлі) як відповідно до ваших 
потреб, так і за критеріями програми (зокрема, з урахуванням обмежень ціни та 
площі)? 
5. Чи вважаєте ви 50% компенсації достатнім у зв'язку з обмеженням доходу, яке 
вимагає програма? 
6. Що є джерелом вашої 50% частки? Наприклад, особисті заощадження, 
банківський кредит, фінансування, запозичене у родичів. Наскільки вам було 
важко отримати це фінансування? 
7. Чи складно було зібрати всі необхідні документи? Якщо ні, з якими 
документами виникла проблема і чому? 
8. Скільки часу займає черга очікування до отримання рішення? 
9. Як загалом ви оцінюєте процес подання заявки на отримання цієї фінансової 
допомоги? Які були найлегші та найскладніші кроки процесу? 
10. (За необхідності). Чому, на вашу думку, вашу заявку не було схвалено? 
11. (Для тих, хто отримав допомогу) Чи задоволені ви своїм поточним житлом? 
Чому так / ні? 
11. (Для тих, хто не отримав допомогу) Чи задоволені ви своїм поточним 







Questionnaire for non-participants in Ukrainian 
1. Чи маєте ви довідку про статус ВПО? Чи знаєте ви щось про державні 
програми з питань житла для ВПО? Якщо так, то що саме? Ви коли-небудь чули 
про програму Доступне житло? 
2.Чи хочете ви придбати житло? Якщо так, чи вважаєте ви за краще розглянути 
первинний чи вторинний ринок? Чому? Доступне житло допомагає лише з 
первинним. Чи вважаєте Ви цю вимогу логічною? Чому так / ні? 
3. Чи володієте ви житловою площею (крім житла, яке знаходиться на тимчасово 
окупованій території)? Відповідно до вимог програми, заявник не може мати у 
власності більше 14 м2. Чи вважаєте Ви цю вимогу логічною? Якщо ні, чому ні? 
4. Відповідно до критеріїв програми площа не повинна перевищувати 20м кв на 
людину плюс 10 на всю сім'ю. Чи вважаєте Ви цю вимогу прийнятною? Якщо ні, 
чому? 
5. Державна програма Доступне житло може забезпечити 50% компенсацію 
нової ціни на житло. Чи змогли б ви дозволити собі придбати нову квартиру, якби 
цю компенсацію вам дали? Якщо ні, який розмір компенсації вам знадобиться? 
6. Що, швидше за все, могло б бути джерелом вашої частини фінансування? 
Наприклад, особисті заощадження, банківський кредит, фінансування, 
запозичене у родичів. Чи буде вам важко зібрати це з вашим поточним доходом? 
7. Програма вимагає, щоб учасники не мали доходу, що перевищує 
середньомісячну зарплату на одного члена сім'ї, що становить приблизно 15 
тисяч гривень. Чи вважаєте Ви цю вимогу прийнятною? Якщо ні, чому ні? 
8. Чи задоволені ви своїм поточним житлом? Чому так / ні? Ви хочете взяти 
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